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Testing the Limits of Jailbreaking Defenses with the Purple Problem

Taeyoun Kim, Suhas Kotha, Aditi Raghunathan

The rise of "jailbreak" attacks on language models has led to a flurry of defenses aimed at preventing undesirable responses. We critically examine the two stages of the defense pipeline: (i) defining what constitutes unsafe outputs, and (ii) enforcing the definition via methods such as input processing or fine-tuning. To test the efficacy of existing enforcement mechanisms, we consider a simple and well-specified definition of unsafe outputs--outputs that contain the word "purple". Surprisingly, existing fine-tuning and input defenses fail on this simple problem, casting doubt on whether enforcement algorithms can be robust for more complicated definitions. We find that real safety benchmarks similarly test enforcement for a fixed definition. We hope that future research can lead to effective/fast enforcement as well as high quality definitions used for enforcement and evaluation.

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